Naval War College Review
Volume 66
Number 1 Winter

Article 4

2013

The Secretary and CNO on 23–24 October 1962
William H.J. Manthorpe Jr.

Follow this and additional works at: https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review
Recommended Citation
Manthorpe, William H.J. Jr. (2013) "The Secretary and CNO on 23–24 October 1962," Naval War College Review: Vol. 66 : No. 1 ,
Article 4.
Available at: https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol66/iss1/4

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Naval War College Review by an authorized editor of U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
repository.inquiries@usnwc.edu.

Manthorpe: The Secretary and CNO on 23–24 October 1962

THE SECRETARY AND CNO ON 23–24 OCTOBER 1962
Setting the Historical Record Straight
Captain William H. J. Manthorpe, Jr., U.S. Navy (Retired)

T

he Cuban missile crisis was a defining moment in the career of the Chief of
Naval Operations (CNO) at the time, Admiral George W. Anderson, Jr. His
leadership of the Navy during the crisis has become the most prominent role accorded to him in history. Yet his relationship during the crisis with the Secretary
of Defense, Robert S. McNamara, has been cited as the factor that brought to a
premature end his tour as CNO and his naval career. Among the events that affected the admiral’s relationship with the secretary during the crisis were those
that took place on 23–24 October 1962 in CNO’s Intelligence Plot (IP)—part
of the Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI), located adjacent to but separate from
CNO’s operational Flag Plot and charged with providing all-source intelligence
to the CNO, cleared Navy staff, and others.
Unfortunately, much of what has been written about what went on in CNO IP
during those two critical days is inaccurate in two significant aspects—first, what
occurred between the admiral and the secretary during the evening of the 23rd;
and second, what transpired between the IP staff and the secretary overnight and
during the morning of the 24th.
With regard to the evening of the 23rd, the earliest book on the Cuban missile crisis, Elie Abel’s The Missile Crisis, described an event that, in the context of
his narrative, took place on 24 October.1 That event had two parts. One involved
Admiral Anderson taking the secretary aside and explaining why a destroyer was
out of position. The second part involved a description of the secretary aggressively questioning the admiral about how the quarantine would be conducted
and the admiral responding defensively and heatedly. The date of 24 October
and the details of that event were repeated shortly thereafter by Graham Allison
in his Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis, long considered the
definitive book on the subject.2 In interviews with both authors and again in his
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oral history collected by the John F. Kennedy Presidential Library, the admiral
acknowledged the first part of the story. But he said that his recollection of the
words and actions attributed to him when questioned by the secretary about
the quarantine operations were not as portrayed in the accounts.3 Both authors
noted the admiral’s denial but used the story, as told by Abel on the basis of unidentified sources, in their books.4
Thus the date of 24 October and the story of that event have been included,
in some form, in almost all histories of the Cuban missile crisis. Indeed, despite
subsequent interviews with both principals, they have even appeared in the official history of the Office of the Secretary of Defense, in a history of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff (JCS), in the authorized biography of Admiral Anderson, and on
the website entry recording his burial at Arlington National Cemetery.5 It is only
recently that published research has shown that the event actually occurred on
23 October, not the 24th.6
With respect to what occurred on the morning of the 24th, Robert Kennedy,
in his Thirteen Days, described how the president and his advisers gathered in
the White House, tensely awaiting the arrival of the first Soviet ships at the quarantine line and worrying about how the presence of a Soviet submarine would
affect events as the quarantine was enforced. The book recounts how, at the last
minute, ONI informed the president and the group that the Soviet ships had
turned back. That brought the reputed exclamation by Secretary of State Dean
Rusk, “We’re eyeball to eyeball and I think the other fellow just blinked.” 7 As a
result of that story a number of historical accounts have suggested that IP, on behalf of Admiral Anderson and the Navy, did not adequately inform the secretary
and president of the activities of the Soviet ships that had been approaching the
quarantine line.8 Those accounts are based on clearly secondhand information
by representatives of other intelligence agencies, individuals who had no direct
knowledge of what occurred in IP.9
Thus it seems appropriate to set the record straight, on the basis of firsthand
recollections (as complete and accurate as fifty-year-old memories will allow) of
those who were actually in CNO IP with the admiral on those days and on official
documentation prepared when memories were fresh.10
22 OCTOBER: THE FUSE OF CRISIS IS IGNITED
Monday, 22 October, was a day of final diplomatic, policy, and operational preparations before the president’s evening speech announcing the establishment of
what he would call a “quarantine” of Cuba. But for IP it was most significant as
the day when the submarine presence in the area of the Navy’s deploying quarantine forces became apparent. The first report was of a visual sighting of a Soviet
Zulu-class (NATO designation) long-range, diesel-powered attack submarine
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol66/iss1/4
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refueling from a naval support tanker, Terek. That submarine had been operating off the mid-Atlantic coast and was preparing to return to home waters. The
Navy’s underwater Sound Surveillance System (SOSUS) then gained contact on
another submarine, which when sighted by a patrol aircraft was identified as a
Foxtrot-class (NATO designation) diesel-powered attack submarine.11
On the basis of those operationally derived reports,
CNO immediately alerted his Fleet Commanders to the possibility of submarine attack with: “I cannot emphasize too strongly how smart we must be to keep our heavy
ships, particularly carriers, from being hit by surprise attack from Soviet submarines.
Use all available intelligence, deceptive tactics, and evasion during forthcoming days.
12
Good luck.”

At 7 PM that evening, President John F. Kennedy told the nation that “unmistakable evidence has established the fact that a series of offensive missile sites is now
in preparation” in Cuba. Therefore, he announced, “to halt this offensive buildup,
a strict quarantine on all offensive military equipment under shipment to Cuba
is being initiated. All ships of any kind bound for Cuba from whatever nation or
port will, if found to contain cargoes of offensive weapons, be turned back.”13
Immediately after that speech and for the rest of the night, IP became a hotbed
of briefing activity. Soon after the broadcast, a call came from the Defense Intelligence Agency watch in the Joint Chiefs of Staff situation room that Secretary
McNamara was en route to IP with the CNO, the Secretary of the Navy, and
others for a briefing on the submarine and merchant ship situation. The party
was duly briefed on the merchant-shipping activity, as shown on the IP plotting
boards. The submarine intelligence briefer, Lieutenant Commander John R.
“Jack” Prisley, then briefed the secretary personally on the submarine situation,
kneeling next to his chair and using a special handheld folding plotting board.
That evening briefing established what was expected to be the regular schedule of
formal IP briefings for the secretary: they were to occur each morning at about
9 AM, before he went to the White House, and at about 10 PM, before he retired
to his office for the night. Following the briefing, Secretary McNamara visited
the office of the CNO for discussions of the quarantine and the establishment of
surveillance.14
23 OCTOBER: A DAY OF TENSE WAITING
At about 3 AM on Tuesday morning, 23 October, when all seemed quiet, the door
to IP opened and in strode Secretary McNamara and a couple of his assistants.
He did a quick tour and then dropped himself into a chair in front of the plotting board, on which was displayed an ocean chart and a map of Cuba. After
staring at the plot for a few minutes he began to question the ONI duty officer,
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Commander Robert E. “Bob” Bublitz. The secretary’s principal concern seemed
to be the Cuban navy’s eight Soviet-supplied Komar (NATO designation) guidedmissile boats. As part of his regularly assigned duties, Commander Bublitz had
been responsible for the collection of intelligence on those boats, and he was able
to respond fully and accurately to the secretary’s questions. Seemingly dissatisfied
that the duty officer was so sure of himself, the secretary harrumphed, got out of
his chair, and left the plot without another word.15
As the morning of the 23rd progressed, the atmosphere became tense as the
Navy and IP waited to see what the Soviets would do in response to the president’s announcement. Would the Soviet merchant ships maintain their courses
and speeds toward Cuba? How would they act as they approached the quarantine
line? How would they react when challenged? How would the Soviet submarines
now known to be taking up positions near the quarantine line act to support the
merchant ships or respond when prosecuted by our operating forces?
At about 9:45, with Lieutenant Thomas Rodgers on hand as the principal
briefer and Lieutenant Commander Prisley as the submarine briefer, the secretary was apprised of the merchant-ship and submarine situations. The Flag Plot
operations briefers covered the plans for Navy low-level overflights of Cuba.
McNamara then went directly to the White House to meet with the president
and his advisers.16
Meanwhile, reports had been arriving indicating that in the early morning hours of the 23rd, Moscow time, a message of very urgent precedence had
been sent to a number of Soviet merchant ships. Also, the Soviet intelligencecollection trawler Skhval, operating in the Atlantic, had received and relayed a flashprecedence message. But the reports of those unusual communications offered no
insights into their purposes, because in those days the National Security Agency
(NSA) produced only “information, not intelligence.”17
Apparently as a result of those urgent messages, the ships began relaying urgent messages to others, and from others to Moscow, and reporting their own
positions. Thus throughout 23 October, intelligence reporting provided the latest direction-finder (DF) positions of many ships, as well as their last reported
true positions and previous DF positions.18 That information was plotted in IP
and then “dead-reckoned” ahead to project estimated dates and times of arrival
at the quarantine line. At that time, while the purpose of the unusual and urgent
Soviet communication activity was unknown, it was assumed that it was related
to instructions for the ships as to how they should approach the quarantine line
and respond to U.S. intercept attempts.
Thus, during the National Security Council (NSC) meeting on that evening,
the President instructed McNamara to review all details of instructions to the Fleet
Commanders regarding procedures to be followed in the blockade. There was
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extended discussion of actions to be taken under various assumed Soviet resistance
activities such as (a) failing to stop, (b) refusing to be boarded, (c) ships turning
19
around, heading in another direction, etc.

Secretary McNamara then held a press conference in which he announced that
an effective quarantine would be established at 10 AM Eastern Daylight Time on
the 24th. He also announced that
the Joint Chiefs of Staff have designated Admiral George Anderson, Chief of Naval
operations, as their Executive Agent for the operation of the quarantine and the quarantine forces. In turn, Admiral [Robert] Dennison, Commander in Chief, Atlantic is
the responsible Unified Commander. And operating under him in direct charge of
the quarantine force will be Vice Admiral Alfred Ward, Commander of the Second
20
Fleet.

THE EVENING OF 23 OCTOBER: TENSION ERUPTS
Following that press conference, as the CNO Report briefly notes, “at 2045 [8:45
PM], Secretary McNamara had requested information concerning the first ships
which would be intercepted, and Admiral Anderson consulted with Admiral
Dennison on the matter.” That entry indicates that Secretary McNamara was
interested in how the operations of the quarantine would be implemented, but
its unusual brevity suggests that the details of how he expressed that interest
and what went on after he did so would be inappropriate for an official report.
Although, accordingly, what actually happened that night in Flag Plot and IP
between Secretary McNamara and Admiral Anderson was not officially recorded,
an account of what supposedly happened was provided by Abel and has long
been included in almost every story of the Cuban missile crisis since. But it has
always been said to have occurred on the 24th, not the 23rd, when at least some
of what Abel and others have described actually happened.
Admiral Anderson later said that the event was “not even of sufficient importance for me to write down in my diary.”21 But others did the job for him. The
best items of evidence that the event did not take place on 24 October but rather
on the 23rd are, first, the brief, circumspect entry in the CNO Report for the
23rd indicating that a McNamara-Anderson meeting did occur; and second, the
CNO’s Office Log for the 24th, which reports that by the time of the secretary’s
arrival in Flag Plot that evening the admiral had already departed for home and
that Admiral Claude V. Ricketts, the Vice Chief of Naval Operations, was the duty
CNO. Thus, no McNamara-Anderson meeting could have occurred that night.22
Additionally, though they date the event to the 24th, all the published accounts
provide good internal evidence that the event actually occurred on the evening of
the 23rd. The Abel story says, “McNamara asked about the first interception: exactly what would the Navy do?” The History of the Office of the Secretary of Defense
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2013
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relates, “According to McNamara’s account, when the CNO informed him that a
Soviet vessel would reach the quarantine line the following day, McNamara asked
what he would do when it got there.” Since the quarantine was to be implemented
on the morning of the 24th, questions about the “the [upcoming, in context] first
interception” and “what he would do” when a Soviet ship reached the quarantine
line the “following day” all must have been asked on the evening of the 23rd.
They would not have been asked on the night of the 24th, by when it was clear
that the Soviet ships would not be
The belief of historians that there was a “fail- penetrating the quarantine line.
ure of intelligence cooperation” and their perThere is no doubt that on the
plexity as to why ONI held up information evening of the 23rd McNamara
critical to the president’s decisions appear to be and Anderson had a meeting, one
unfounded.
that Anderson termed an “incident” and Defense Department
historians have called a “confrontation.” That event did include Anderson taking
the secretary aside to explain a submarine contact, and it also included a contentious discussion of quarantine operations. But it occurred quite differently than
Abel’s unnamed sources and the elaborations of others have reported. Certainly,
as Abel originally said, “Witnesses only disagree.”
That evening, at the time of his regular evening brief, the secretary went to
Flag Plot first, where he apparently began questioning whether a destroyer was
out of place.23 The admiral, not wanting to discuss that matter with the secretary
in the crowded Flag Plot, took him into IP, accompanied by Deputy Secretary of
Defense Roswell Gilpatric, Secretary of the Navy Fred Korth, and their respective
military executive assistants. It is possible that the Under Secretary of Defense for
Public Affairs, Arthur Sylvester, followed that group in. McNamara and Anderson
sat in chairs at a small table in front of the sliding display boards, with others
standing behind or to the sides.
As usual, Prisley knelt next to McNamara with his plotting folder to give his
submarine intelligence presentation, explaining also why the destroyer was out of
the line. When Prisley had finished but was still kneeling beside him, McNamara
took out his thin Eversharp pencil and used it as a pointer to tell Admiral Anderson to move certain destroyers to certain positions and to move aircraft surveillance to a certain area. The CNO tried three times to tell the secretary that Admiral Dennison, to whom he had given operational control, was experienced and
capable, needing only to be told what the secretary wanted to accomplish—he
would move the forces as necessary. Twice the admiral asked the secretary what it
was he wanted to accomplish by those moves, so he could tell Admiral Dennison.
Finally McNamara asked the CNO whether he knew what an order was, and the
admiral replied, “Yes, sir”; McNamara repeated his directions, saying, “This is
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol66/iss1/4
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an order,” and walked out. The CNO then took Prisley, along with his plotting
folder, next door to Flag Plot to use the secure phone to give Admiral Dennison
the secretary’s orders.24
As a result of that telephone call, the CNO Report states,
they [Anderson and Dennison] decided that they should go after the Soviet vessels
Kimovsk and Gagarin, effecting contact at about the same time on the 24th. The
approximate locations of both ships were known by direction finder fixes and they
felt search aircraft would have a good chance of spotting them. The [antisubmarine
aircraft carrier] Essex group would be used to intercept them.
Another approaching ship, Poltava, was to be assigned for interdiction to [the heavy
cruisers] Newport News, Canberra, and four destroyers. It was believed that the intercept would be made late on the 24th.
In a memorandum relating these plans, Admiral Anderson said that there was a hazard of possible submarines in interdicting the first two ships, but pointed out that the
interception would be made by a Hunter/Killer Group.

In that memorandum to the Secretary of Defense, Admiral Anderson also made
an attempt to avoid another operational decision-making session with the secretary, by stating, “From now on, I do not intend to interfere with Dennison or
either of the admirals on scene unless we get some additional intelligence, which
we are hoping for.”25
The realization that this event occurred on 23 October makes it easier to
understand how it developed as it did. The secretary’s support of the blockade
had probably been the deciding vote in the president’s decision to establish a
quarantine.26 Just hours before he had been told by the president to “review all . . .
instructions to the Fleet Commanders.” Thus, he was asking detailed questions
and giving detailed orders because of what he viewed as his personal responsibility to ensure the success of the quarantine operation. The admiral, for his part,
likely considered that, the president having reviewed the Navy’s plans for the
quarantine on the 21st, the authority and responsibility for conducting the quarantine had been delegated to him and the Navy. The president had said, “Well,
Admiral, it looks as though this is up to the Navy.” Anderson must have felt that
his reputation was linked to the success of the operation, having replied to the
president, “The Navy will not let you down.”27 Furthermore, he and the secretary
had again discussed the plans on the evening of the 22nd.28 Finally, it must have
seemed to the admiral that authority and responsibility for execution of the quarantine had just been publicly delegated to him and the Navy by the secretary’s
just-concluded press conference.
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In light of those differing beliefs about the operational chain of command
and the fact that both men felt personally responsible for ensuring a favorable
outcome to the operation, it is easy to understand how any discussion could
have become contentious.29 Both were tense and tired, awaiting a confrontation between a Soviet merchant ship and an American warship in just twelve
hours—a confrontation that, given the presence of Soviet submarines, could
spark an exchange of weapons leading to war. In such an event, the two men had
different ultimate goals: the secretary wanted to ensure that when an interception occurred, armed confrontation was avoided, whereas the admiral wanted to
be sure that if one occurred, the forces were adequately deployed and ready to
handle it. Thus the secretary would have been angered by what he considered the
admiral’s evasive, unsatisfactory, and, some say, belligerent answers as he tried
to carry out the president’s directive to “review all . . . instructions to the Fleet
Commanders” and to ensure caution. On the other hand, the admiral would have
been angered at the secretary’s apparent attempt to revise deployment plans and
exercise operational control from Washington just twelve hours before the arrival
of the merchant ships at the quarantine line and possible armed encounters with
submarines. Understandably, tempers flared on both sides.
Admiral Anderson may have suspected that details of the meeting would
become the stuff of leaks, rumors, and gossip. IP was immediately instructed
by the CNO’s executive assistant, Captain Isaac C. “Ike” Kidd, Jr., to make sure
that no one except the secretary, deputy secretary, CNO, and senior flag officers
from CNO’s office were given admittance in the future. The CNO’s Office Log for
25 October shows that Rear Admiral John McCain, Jr., then the Navy Chief of
Information, discussed with Captain Kidd plans for Under Secretary Sylvester to
have coffee with CNO and be briefed in Flag Plot. Captain Kidd said, “Flag Plot
ok, but not IP.”
THE NIGHT OF 23–24 OCTOBER: WHAT DID THEY KNOW, AND
WHEN DID THEY KNOW IT?
Because of the purposeful arrival in IP of the admiral bringing the secretary from
Flag Plot to explain the position of the destroyer, followed by the secretary’s rapid
departure, the usual evening intelligence brief covering the positions and movements of the approaching Soviet merchant ships was not given. Unfortunately,
there are no notes of what that brief would have included.30 But at about the
scheduled time of that briefing, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) summarized the merchant-shipping situation: “Of the nine ships involved in the ‘very
urgent’ encrypted communications yesterday two have already arrived in Cuban
ports. We have not noted any unusual activity on the part of the seven other ships
involved in these communications that would reflect any instructions they may
have received.”31
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol66/iss1/4

NWC_Winter2013Review.indd 28

8

10/31/12 9:48 AM

Manthorpe: The Secretary and CNO on 23–24 October 1962

MANTHORPE

29

According to CIA, the latest “known position” for Kimovsk was roughly three
hundred nautical miles (nm) east of the planned quarantine line, as of 3 AM
Washington time. For Poltava the latest “known position” had been obtained
at 11 AM Washington time, roughly eight hundred nautical miles northeast of
the quarantine line. These reported known positions were based on the ships’
required daily position reports, rather than DF. Thus the most reliable positions
at the time of the evening briefing were eighteen and ten hours old, respectively.
Using those positions, a dead-reckoning (DR) plot in IP would have shown
that Kimovsk would arrive at the
Finally McNamara asked the CNO whether he quarantine line by about 1000 (or
knew what an order was, and the admiral re- 10 AM) on the 24th, as expected.
plied, “Yes, sir”; McNamara repeated his direc- But a DR plot would have shown
tions, saying, “This is an order,” and walked out. that Poltava could not arrive at
the quarantine line as had been
expected—indeed, not until sometime on the 26th. There was no “known position” available for Gagarin, the third ship of primary interest.
In addition to those known positions, however, a DF position had been obtained on Kimovsk at 4:23 PM Washington time showing it still about three hundred miles from the quarantine line, or just about where it had been sixteen hours
earlier.32 Clearly the ship had slowed or stopped for most of the day. But since
the position had been derived from DF, the true position, course, and speed of
Kimovsk could not be determined. Dead-reckoning Kimovsk westward at ten
knots from that position would have made it clear that the ship could not arrive
at the quarantine line by 1000 on the 24th, at that speed. However, if Kimovsk
increased speed westward after reaching that position it could arrive sometime
later in the day. Thus, on the evening of the 23rd the secretary would have been
briefed (by the author, who was the briefer that evening) that Kimovsk had slowed
or could have stopped during the day; that because information on the ship’s
course and speed was not available, it could not be determined whether, where,
or when the ship would arrive at the quarantine line; but that arrival sometime
on the 24th could not be ruled out. The secretary would have been told also that
Poltava had also stopped and could not arrive until the 26th, and that there was
no position available for Gagarin.
But the secretary did not take that brief. The author completed his twelvehour shift as briefer and retired, leaving his notes for the overnight crew.
On this the critical night before the quarantine was to be initiated, IP was
fully manned with highly qualified hands. In addition to the IP watch officer and
the ONI duty officer, Commander Howard W. “Howdy” Holschuh would have
been present. Early in the crisis he had been relieved of all his regular duties in
ONI and assigned to IP on a twenty-four-hour basis as the officer responsible for
plotting and analyzing merchant-shipping intelligence and briefing members of
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2013
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the CNO’s staff on it. His efforts provided the basis for the merchant-shipping
portions of the regular briefings to the CNO and secretary. Furthermore, Captain Maurice H. “Mike” Rindskopf, the Assistant Director of Naval Intelligence
(DNI) for Production, was also present that night. Early in the crisis he had been
assigned to represent the DNI in overseeing ONI’s activities related to the missile
crisis. Finally, IP would have been in close touch via secure phone with the Naval
Field Operational Intelligence Office (NFOIO) colocated with NSA in order to
receive speedy analysis of the Naval Security Group (NSG) reporting.
The official NSA history states, “Late the same day NSG direction finding indicated that some of the Soviet merchant vessels heading for Cuba had stopped
dead in the water, while others appeared to be turning around. At this point, the
Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI) felt that this information had to be verified before it was reported.”33 On the basis of the NSA account, it would appear that during the night of 23–24 October, aside from Kimovsk, NSG reported DF positions
on additional ships that showed them near their previous known positions.34
Then, the NSA history continues, citing the account of Dino Brugioni, “John
McCone [the Director of Central Intelligence] was awakened in the middle of the
night and informed that the Navy had unconfirmed information [presumably
that the ships had slowed or halted], but this was not passed to the White House
or the secretary of defense until noon [actually, as we will see, it was passed earlier, certainly by 1030] of the following day, once ONI had ‘confirmed’ the information. When he found out, McNamara was furious, and he subjected Admiral
Anderson, the Chief of Naval Operations, to an abusive tirade.” The NSA account
concludes that “so many years have passed that it is impossible to determine why
the Navy held up information that seemed critical to the president’s decisions.”
That brief account does not fully or accurately describe the activities of the
night and has led at least one historian of the crisis to conclude that it “illuminates a failure of intelligence cooperation” and negligence on the part of ONI.35
In his fuller account, Brugioni states, “The CIA Watch Officer, Harry Eisenbiess, checked with the Office of Naval Intelligence. They were also in receipt
of the NSA information but could not confirm change of course. On-the-spot
visual verification would have to wait until morning. The Navy thought it might
be a Soviet ploy.”36 To check with ONI, the CIA watch officer would have communicated with IP, where the new positions already would have been plotted by
the watch officer, analyzed by the duty officer and Commander Holschuh, and
discussed with NFOIO.37 That night, while of course interested in all the ships, IP
was mostly focused on supporting the CNO, Flag Plot, and the quarantine forces
with information on those of immediate high interest—Kimovsk, Poltava, and
Gagarin. The rationale for waiting for visual confirmation would likely have been
that it was already known that Kimovsk would not be arriving at the quarantine
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol66/iss1/4
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line on time and that Poltava had stopped and would not be arriving on the 24th
at all. Gagarin was unlocated but like the other ships was farther east and not
expected at the quarantine line the next morning. Visual surveillance of them all
by quarantine force aircraft at first light would leave plenty of time to confirm
their courses, speeds, and expected times and places of arrival at the quarantine
line and then for the on-scene commander to position forces for intercept. Thus,
for the IP watch, there was no need to alert decision makers in the middle of the
night to give them inconclusive information when good information for decision
making by the on-scene commander and Washington was not yet available but
could come early in the morning.
Despite the ONI view, according to Brugioni,
Eisenbiess was convinced of the validity of the NSA information and in the wee hours
of the morning of 24 October went to McCone’s home. McCone[,] aroused from a
sound sleep, was told that at least five of the Soviet ships had changed course and
were headed back to Russia but that the Navy could not verify the NSA information.
38
McCone said he would convey the information to the White House immediately.

Given McCone’s statement, he must have intended to call the White House himself or to have a senior agency official check with the CIA watch and then inform
the White House Situation Room. That would have been required, because during the early days of the Cuban missile crisis
the Situation Room began taking a more active hand in crisis alerting and in keeping the president informed. It was basically an arm of the CIA, however. All SIGINT
[signals intelligence] products of interest to the president and the National Security
Council staff passed through CIA, which forwarded key items after it had taken off
39
the NSA header. . . . [B]ut NSA was not directly involved.

McCone was not the only decision maker awake that night. As he had done the
night before, Secretary McNamara came to IP about 3 AM. There is no full record
of what ensued, but one of the officers present would have given him a briefing,
using the notes prepared for the earlier, aborted brief. Thus the secretary would
have certainly been told now what he could have learned at 9 PM—that Kimovsk
had slowed or stopped during the day but that lack of information on the ship’s
course and speed made any estimate of its arrival at the quarantine line on the
24th inconclusive, though arrival on that day could not be ruled out; that Poltava
had also stopped and could not arrive until the 26th; and that no position was
available for Gagarin. Other DF positions on additional ships having apparently
been obtained, they would also have been reported. Given that all these reports
were based on DF positions, which can indicate general location but not course
or speed, it is unlikely that without further confirmation a naval intelligence
briefer would conclude that the ships had reversed course.
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But because of the secretary’s keen interest in the operational aspects of the
quarantine he would have asked questions, so that the possibility of a standstill or
turnaround must have been discussed. As a senior officer with considerable planning and operational experience, Rindskopf would have assured the secretary
that aerial surveillance from Essex was expected to provide firm visual updates on
most of the ships at first light. If the ships had turned, that could be confirmed
well in advance of their expected arrivals at the quarantine line. If the secretary
went next door to Flag Plot and expressed concern, he would have received a
similar assurance there. But while those assurances may have been given, Rindskopf has repeatedly recalled, “I found myself . . . reporting to SECDEF [Secretary
of Defense] McNamara . . . at 0300 [3 AM] . . . that the Soviet ships carrying missiles to . . . Cuba and the accompanying F-class submarines had actually reversed
course.”40 That would have been his personal “estimate” of the situation, and it is
unknown to what extent the secretary accepted it.
MORNING, 24 OCTOBER: THE DAY OF RECKONING
That morning the CNO Report indicates that at “about 0900, SECDEF received a
standard merchant ship briefing.” Deputy Secretary Gilpatric also attended that
briefing, and his handwritten notes show that the intelligence that the secretary
could have gotten on the evening of the 23rd and presumably did get in the
early morning hours of the 24th had not changed.41 With regard to Kimovsk, the
secretary was told of the DF position late on the 23rd and that the ship had not
been sighted. Given the anxiety that all must have felt as the time for implementation of the quarantine approached, the unexpectedly inconclusive position of
Kimovsk and the lack of a sighting report from the quarantine force must have
elicited some comment from the briefer, question from the secretary, or perhaps a
remark by Vice Admiral Charles D. Griffin, the Deputy CNO for Operations and
CNO representative that morning, about the uncertainty and probable delay of
the arrival time of the ship at the quarantine line. Nevertheless, for some reason
Gilpatric noted that the ship was “due 10:30 AM inside the barrier.” Gagarin had
not been sighted but was assumed to be behind Kimovsk. Apparently, a DF position had been obtained on Poltava that placed it within eighty miles of its last
known position and 850 miles from the quarantine line; thus the deputy secretary noted that its arrival time was estimated to be 4 AM on the 27th. The notes
also show that the secretary was informed that there was one submarine in the
vicinity of the barrier.
Thus, on the basis of what transpired during the night of 23–24 October in
CNO IP, the belief of historians that there was a “failure of intelligence cooperation” and their perplexity as to why ONI held up information critical to the president’s decisions appear to be unfounded. CIA and IP cooperated on the analysis
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol66/iss1/4
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of the incoming DF messages during the night. While ONI originally did not
intend to wake the CNO and secretary to report a possible turnaround based on
inconclusive and unconfirmed DF reports, once the secretary appeared in IP the
senior person present who agreed with the CIA view told him of the possibility.
Thus, two key decision makers—McCone and McNamara—had been informed
in some manner and to some degree of a changing situation with respect to the
merchant ships. CIA may have passed its views to the White House Situation
Room. Regardless of all that, it is unclear what the president’s decision could have
been until definitive information was received from the quarantine forces about
the positions and activities of the Soviet ships.
The CNO Report indicates, “At the same time [probably as the briefing was
going on, i.e., about 9:30], Flag Plot [actually, IP] received the first directional fix
report that some Soviet ships bound for Cuba had reversed course. This information was inconclusive and Mr. McNamara was not informed.”
Since DF reports had been coming in all night, this was likely the first report
confirming that a ship had actually turned back, by providing a new DF position
well to the east of both the last known and previous DF positions, which had
been considered inconclusive. Since that information apparently was received in
IP while the briefing to the secretary was going on, the watch officer, a lieutenant (junior grade), had to wait to gain access to the boards to plot the incoming
report and would have wanted a more senior officer to consider it and discuss
it with the NFOIO before informing the Secretary of Defense. The secretary
departed the briefing and went directly to the White House to await the implementation of the quarantine at 1000.
1000, 24 OCTOBER: THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE QUARANTINE
The CNO Report indicates that the CNO was meeting with the JCS as
the moment of the quarantine’s beginning arrived and passed, and matters continued
without untoward incident until . . . [Commander Task Group] 44.3 in [the attack
transport] Cambria [APA 36] reported a disappearing radar contact and that he suspected he was being followed by a submarine. The information was passed immediately to CNO, who left the JCS meeting and returned to his office.
At about the same time, it became apparent from radio directional fixes that some of
the Soviet ships en route to Cuba had either slowed down or had altered or reversed
their courses. Initial indications of these facts were confirmed by separate plots
maintained in Flag Plot [IP] and in the Navy Field Operational Intelligence Section
[sic—Office, i.e., NFOIO] at Fort Meade. The duty officer set about to notify the
Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of the Navy, and CNO, through the Director of
Naval Intelligence, of the possibility that some of the Soviet ships were not going to
penetrate the quarantine line.
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The CNO’s Office Log also shows that
NSA [actually NFOIO, colocated with NSA] notified Flag Plot [IP] that the Russian
ships had turned back. The word was received by message and plotted. Flag Plot [IP]
notified SECDEF, JCS, and SECNAV [the Secretary of the Navy—likely their offices
by telephone]. RADM Lowrance [Rear Admiral Vernon L. Lowrance, the Director of
Naval Intelligence] who was there decided to deliver the report in person to CNO and
left for the latter’s office. RADM Lowrance arrived before the CNO [who was walking
back to his office from the JCS spaces so as to be available, because of the submarine
contact report] and gave the report to VADM Griffin [the CNO representative] who
left immediately for Flag Plot [IP] with ADM Lowrance. Neither told anyone else of
42
the report.

Meanwhile, the members of the NSC were gathered at the White House, awaiting the implementation of the quarantine. According to the firsthand account of
the attorney general, Robert Kennedy:
It was now a few minutes after 10:00 o’clock. Secretary McNamara announced that
two Russian ships, Gagarin [consistently reported as unlocated, farther to the east,
and never briefed as possibly arriving by IP] and Komiles [sic—Kimovsk] were within
a few miles of our quarantine barrier. The interception of both ships would probably
be before noon Washington time. Indeed the expectation was that one of the vessels
would be stopped and boarded between 10:30 and 11:00 o’clock.
Then came the disturbing Navy report that a Russian submarine had moved into
position between the two ships. . . .
I think these few minutes were the time of gravest concern for the President. . . .
Then it was 10:25—a messenger brought a note to John McCone. “Mr. President, we
have a preliminary report which seems to indicate that some of the Russian ships
stopped dead in the water.”
Stopped dead in the water? Which ships? Are they checking the accuracy of the re43
port? Is it true? I looked at the clock. 10:32.

Kennedy says that McCone stepped out of the room to get more information
and that upon returning he reported, “The report is accurate, Mr. President. Six
ships previously on their way to Cuba at the edge of the quarantine line have
stopped or have turned back toward the Soviet Union. A representative from the
Office of Naval Intelligence is on his way over with the full report.”
The representatives arriving from ONI with the information were likely to
have been Commander George Stroud, the head of IP, and Lieutenant Thomas
Rodgers, who had just completed the briefing and was the person most current
on the information.
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Despite the tension in the White House concerning the imminence of a
confrontation at the quarantine line, as described by Robert Kennedy, it does
not seem that either McCone, McNamara, or the White House Situation Room
had told the president or the assembled group about the anomalous ship position reports received during the night, about which they all had been informed.
Although the information they had been given was not conclusive, it surely suggested that the situation with regard to ships approaching the quarantine line was
at least uncertain and that their arrivals were not imminent. For his part, McNamara, in his briefing, as reported
There is no doubt that on the evening of the by Kennedy, did not accurately
23rd McNamara and Anderson had a meeting, provide the information from the
one that Anderson termed an “incident” and briefing that he had just attended
Defense Department historians have called a and did not include any of the un“confrontation.”
certainty that had been conveyed
to him by ONI. For his part, McCone seems to have been surprised, despite allegedly having been awakened the
night before and been informed that some ships had stopped.44
It was at this meeting that, Abel and Allison report, the Secretary of State, Dean
Rusk, said, “We’re eyeball to eyeball and I think the other fellow just blinked.”45
That literal face-off, of course, never happened. While those in Washington were
awaiting information, out in the Atlantic, as expected by IP, the operational forces
had now visually sighted Kimovsk, Gagarin, and Poltava and determined that they
had turned back. At 0930, when it was expected to be nearing the quarantine line,
Kimovsk was already more than seven hundred miles northeast of the line, heading northeastward at sixteen knots.46
Secretary McNamara was undoubtedly unhappy about not having been the
bearer of the good news to the president, since it came from Defense Department
organizations—NSA and ONI. Having just come to the White House from an IP
briefing, certainly he would have liked to have brought the available news to the
White House.47 But as for Brugioni’s story of McNamara subjecting Anderson to
an “abusive tirade,” there is no record or independent confirmation that it happened. Seemingly, the appropriate time for it to have happened would have been
that day. But there is no record of the two men meeting on 24 October.48 If such
an incident had occurred, however, Admiral Anderson could have remarked that
the secretary had known about the turnaround before he did.49
{LINE-SPACE}
While Secretary McNamara may not have been satisfied with the performance of
IP, Admiral Anderson felt differently. The CNO’s Office Log indicates that on the
morning of 26 October “CAPT Kidd called ADM Lowrance to tell him the CNO
had taken note of the tremendous job his people were doing in coming up with
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info on merchant ships. He asked if there was an objection to kudos for the job
that particular section was doing.”
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are in the Scripps Library at the University
of Virginia, at Miller Center for Public Policy,
millercenter.org/scripps/archives/
presidentialrecordings/kennedy1962/24_62.
Because the White House Situation Room
was staffed by CIA personnel, the staffer delivering the information from ONI naturally
took the note to McCone. But the transcript
of the tapes indicated that upon McCone’s return to the room the president asked, “Where
did you hear this?” and that McCone replied,
“From ONI.”
45. Abel, Missile Crisis, p. 152; Allison, Essence of
Decision, p. 131.
46. See Dobbs’s analysis and plot, One Minute
to Midnight, pp. 88–91. Dobbs says, “This is
the first book to use archival evidence to plot
the actual positions of Soviet and American
ships on the morning of October 24, when
Dean Rusk spoke of the two sides coming
‘eyeball to eyeball’” (p. xiv). He also says, “The
mistaken notion that Soviet ships turned
around at the last moment in a tense battle of
wills between Kennedy and Khrushchev has
lingered for decades. The ‘eyeball to eyeball’
imagery served the political interests of the
Kennedy brothers emphasizing their courage
and coolness at a decisive moment in history”
(p. 88). Finally, he says, “The myth of the
‘eyeball to eyeball’ moment persisted because
previous historians of the missile crisis
failed to use those records to plot the actual
positions of Soviet ships on the morning of
Wednesday, October 24” (p. 91).
47. Dobbs, One Minute to Midnight. “ExComm
members were disturbed by the lack of

https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol66/iss1/4
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real-time information. McNamara in particular, felt the Navy should have shared its
data hours earlier, even though some of it was
ambiguous. He had visited Flag Plot before
going to the White House for the ExComm
meeting, but intelligence officers had termed
the early reports of course changes ‘inconclusive’ and had not bothered to inform him”
(pp. 89–90). Dobbs adds, “Communications
intercepts started arriving direct from the National Security Agency following complaints
from Kennedy and McNamara about the
delay in reporting the turnaround of Soviet
ships” (p. 108).
48. According to the CNO Report, at “about
noon, Mr. McNamara returned to Flag Plot
for a briefing on the information received
concerning the Russian ships reversing
course.” But, according to the CNO Office
Log, at that time the CNO was in his office,
first with General Taylor and then with the
DNI waiting to receive a draft of an intelligence message, which he then took to the
Secretary of the Navy. At 1528, the Office Log
indicates, the secretary arrived in Flag Plot
and Vice Admiral Griffin went to meet him.
At the time Admiral Anderson was in a JCS
meeting. Later in the evening the Log shows
that the CNO left for home at 1818; the CNO
Report shows that Secretaries McNamara and
Gilpatric did not visit IP until 2124.
49. While the secretary learned of the turnaround
at the White House around 1030, the CNO
Office Log shows that the admiral heard of it,
by phone from General Taylor, only at 1043,
because he had been walking back to his
office from the JCS meeting in response to
the report of the submarine contact, to be on
hand in Flag Plot.
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